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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 45547
)
v. ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2014-26736
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Raul Herrera appealed, maintaining that, mindful of the language of I.C. § 18-8004,
as it has been interpreted the Court of Appeals, the district court erred by denying the part of his
I.C.R. 35(a) motion (“Rule 35 motion”) in which he asserted his murder sentence was unlawful.
The State does not raise any arguments regarding the merits of his challenge to the district
court’s decision to deny the part of his motion on the murder sentence.
Rather, the State contends that, because Mr. Herrera waited to file his notice of appeal
until after the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction to finally resolve another
outstanding issue raised in the Rule 35 motion, his appeal was untimely as to the denied part
2regarding his claim about the murder sentence.  The State’s argument is contrary to the Idaho
Supreme Court’s explanations about how I.A.R. 14(a) works, as well as its long-standing policy
against piecemeal appeals.
Because, given the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of I.A.R. 14(a), Mr. Herrera’s
notice of appeal was timely as to the district court’s final resolution of all the issues raised in his
Rule 35 motion, this Court should consider the merits of his argument on appeal.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Herrera’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Herrera’s Rule 35 motion.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Herrera’s Rule 35 Motion
A. The  Time  For  Mr.  Herrera  To  Appeal  The  District  Court’s  Resolution  Of  His  Rule  35
Motion Did Not Begin Until The District Court Actually Resolved All The Issues Raised
In That Motion
Mr. Herrera acknowledges that he did not file his notice of appeal within forty-two days
of the order partially granting and partially denying his motion.  However, that does not mean his
appeal was untimely because that order did not fully resolve all the issues raised in his motion.
That  order  did  not  actually  grant  the  relief  required  by  the  district  court’s  conclusion  that  the
kidnapping sentence was unlawful.  A new sentencing hearing and amended judgment of
conviction were needed to actually correct the unlawful kidnapping sentence.
3As the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, I.A.R. 14(a)’s “forty-two day period to file a
notice of appeal begins to run once an order is entered that resolves all issues, grants all relief to
which the prevailing party is entitled other than attorney fees and costs, and brings an end to the
lawsuit.” Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty’s Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 591 (2010)
(specifically resolving the confusion which existed in regard to when I.A.R. 14(a)’s clock started
running) (emphasis added).  In other words, “‘[a]ppellate review . . . ought properly to await
final determination of the entire case if the parties then feel an appeal is appropriate.’” Long v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 100 Idaho 183, 184 n.1 (1979) (quoting Pichon v. L.J.
Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 602 (1978)) (ellipsis from Long).  The policy behind that
conclusion is to avoid “piecemeal appeals,” which are disfavored except in those “infrequent
case[s] in which the interests of justice [would be] served by an immediate appeal.”
Bishop v. Capital Financial Services, 109 Idaho 866, 868 (1985).
The problems with proceeding on appeal when not all the issues raised to the district
court have been resolved exist in the Rule 35(a) context as well as the civil context. See, e.g.,
State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 433 (Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that not allowing the
district court to rule on a Rule 35(a) motion before ruling on other aspects of the sentence would
result in the district court trying to act “based upon a hypothetical judgment—a judgment with
seven-year probation terms that might exist after the illegal sentences were cured”) (emphasis
from  original).   Therefore,  the  Supreme  Court’s  explanation  about  when  I.A.R.  14(a)’s  clock
begins to run is applicable to the Rule 35(a) context.
The facts of Mr. Herrera’s case actually demonstrate why that explanation applies to Rule
35(a) motions.  The district court’s resolution of the two issues raised in Mr. Herrera’s motion
was expressly intertwined since Mr. Herrera conditioned his stipulation to a particular remedy
4for the unlawful kidnapping sentence on his ability to appeal the district court’s decision on the
murder sentence.1  (Tr., p.39, L.17 - p.40, L.18.)  As a result, the propriety of the district court’s
resolution regarding the kidnapping sentence is dependent on the propriety of the resolution
regarding the murder sentence.  (See App. Br., p.4.)  That means artificially severing those two
issues  and  reviewing  them  under  separate  notices  of  appeal  would  not  serve  the  interests  of
justice because those piecemeal appeals could result in inconsistent conclusions in regard to the
propriety of the resolution of the kidnapping sentence issue.
The State’s argument is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of
I.A.R. 14(a).  For example, it contends that, because I.A.R. 11(c) identifies orders denying a
post-judgment motions (such as a Rule 35(a) motions) as appealable as a matter of right, a
separate notice of appeal needed to be filed within forty-two days of such an order.  (Resp.
Br., pp.3-5.)  However, I.A.R. 11(c) does not specifically address orders partially granting post-
judgment motions, nor does it speak to when such appeals of right need to be initiated. See
generally I.A.R.  11(c).   Therefore,  the  State’s  attempt  to  use  I.A.R.  11(c)  to  dictate  when  the
notice of appeal must be filed is inappropriate. Compare Harrison v. Certain Underwrites at
Lloyd’s, London, 149 Idaho 201, 204 (2010) (explaining that, while I.A.R. 17 allowed for an
appeal of right from an order confirming an arbiter’s award of damages, because I.A.R. 17 did
not  alter  the  time to  file  appeals  under  I.A.R.  14(a),  the  appeal  was  not  timely  as  to  the  initial
order imposing the award because the notice of appeal was not within the time frame set forth in
I.A.R. 14(a)); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (reaching the same conclusion
in the context of a Judgment of Conviction and subsequent Rule 35 motion requesting leniency).
1 Because Mr. Herrera’s stipulation to the kidnapping sentence was specifically conditioned on
his ability to appeal the decision to deny his claim in regard to the murder sentence, if the State is
correct and the notice of appeal was, in fact, not timely on that issue, Mr. Herrera reserves the
right to challenge his attorney’s actions in that regard in post-conviction.
5Rather, the question of when the notice of appeal must be filed is governed by
I.A.R. 14(a).  As explained supra, the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted that rule to mean that
the time to appeal an order partially granting and partially denying a Rule 35(a) motion does not
begin to run until all the issues raised in the motion are fully resolved, meaning all the relief to
which  the  defendant  is  entitled  under  the  partial  grant  of  his  motion  is  actually  effected. See
Goodman Oil, 148 Idaho at 591.  Since the amended judgment resolved the last outstanding issue
raised in Mr. Herrera’s Rule 35 motion by granting the relief needed to correct the illegal
kidnapping sentence, that was the point when the district court’s resolution of Mr. Herrera’s Rule
35(a) motion became final.  Therefore, Mr. Herrera’s notice of appeal, filed within forty-two
days of the final resolution of his Rule 35 motion, was timely to challenge the propriety of the
decisions involved in resolving that motion.  As such, this Court should consider the merits of
Mr. Herrera’s argument on appeal.
B. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Herrera’s Rule 35 Motion
The State does not actually offer any arguments in regard to the merits of Mr. Herrera’s
argument on appeal.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.1-6.)  As such, no further reply is necessary in
that regard.  Rather, Mr. Herrera simply refers the Court back to pages 3-4 of his Appellant’s
Brief.
6CONCLUSION
Mr. Herrera respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his Rule 35 motion
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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